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Abstract 
The existence of marriage premium has long been documented, but its 
underlying causes remain controversial. Several hypotheses exist, with the two major 
ones being the productivity and the selection bias camps. The productivity camp says 
that marriage itself enhances the productivity of workers, which increases the earnings 
of the workers. The selection bias camp argues that the apparent marriage premium is 
caused by "selection bias”，which would occur if women select spouses based on 
characteristics that employers also value in the labor market. If those characteristics 
are unobservable to economists, then marriage premium may appear. This thesis, 
drawing on Chinese twins data, will attempt to eliminate the selection bias, which 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Economists have long disagreed on the magnitude and the underlying causes of 
marriage premium. The marriage premium in the literature generally refers to the 
higher hourly wage achieved by married males compared with unmarried ones. While 
pervious studies have all reported marriage premium to be positive and statistically 
significant, the range of the premium spans from 5 to 50%. 
The disagreement extends to the causes of marriage premium. Four camps of 
hypotheses exist, the productivity camp, the selection bias camp, the discrimination 
camp, and the reverse causality camp, with the two major hypotheses being the 
productivity and selection bias. 
The productivity camp maintains that marriage per se enhances the productivity 
of workers, which in turn, increases the earnings of the workers. Marriage can 
increase the productivity of the workers for at least two reasons. First, marriage allows 
for role specialization. After marriage, men can specialize in "income" production, 
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while his spouse takes care of domestic work. Productivity increases as a result of 
specialization. Second, as some researchers have argued (Kenny 1983), married men 
may have a lower cost of acquiring human capital. Married men can borrow at a lower 
cost from wives to finance human capital accumulation, which leads to higher 
productivity, and thus higher earnings. Married men may also benefit from their wives 
extending information and career advice to them. 
The selection bias camp, on the other hand, hypothesizes that the apparent 
marriage premium is due to selection bias because of omitted variable bias. Women 
may select spouses based on characteristics that are also valued in the labor markets. 
For example, both employers and women may value loyalty, ability, diligence, 
honesty and dependability. If these productivity characteristics cannot be captured in 
regressions, then marriage premium may appear. 
The discrimination camp argues that employers discriminate against single males. 
Employers pay single males a lower wage either due to personal prejudice or 
statistical discrimination. 
Finally, reverse causality maintains that the causation runs in reverse direction. 
They argue that instead of marriage causing higher income, higher income men tend 
to get married. 
To evaluate the empirical merits of different hypotheses, one needs a set of 
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regressions ‘‘cleaned，，of selection bias. However, as we will discuss later in Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3, traditional methods for removing selection bias are flawed. In light of 
this, this thesis will contribute to the marriage premium discussion in two aspects. 
First, I will use twins data to remove selection bias, an approach that still has not been 
widely applied to the marriage premium problem. Second, most of the marriage 
premium studies focus on the western societies, while this is the pioneer study that 
focuses on China. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The existing literature can be broadly classified into three generations. The first 
generation mainly utilizes cross-sectional data to correct the selection bias problem by 
including more relevant variables, while the second generation studies attempt to 
rectify the selection bias problem by using panel data, and the third generation by 
twins data. 
2.1 First-Generation Studies 
Hill (1979), Greenhalf (1980), Bartlett and Callahan (1984) and Siebert and 
Sloane (1981) are among the first group of economists to investigate the marriage 
premium problem. By and large, all cross sectional research reports marriage 
premium to be large and significantly positive. Hill (1979), using data from 1976 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, reports that married men earn significantly higher 
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wages than widowed, divorced, or separated men, who in turn, earn more than the 
never-married men. Greenhalgh (1980) looks at the cross sectional data of British 
workers for 1971 and 1975. She also finds marriage premium to be positive and 
significant. Bartlett and Callahan (1984), utilizing data from 1977 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Older Men, find that married men earn around 20-32% more 
than the otherwise unmarried men. Siebert and Sloane (1981) report even larger 
premium, ranging from 15% to 50%. 
2.2 Second-Generation Studies 
The second generation improves on the first generation by using panel data to 
correct the selection bias problem either by fixed effect estimation or first differencing. 
However, different studies have reached different conclusions on the underlying 
causes of marriage premium. 
One often-cited study by Korenman and Neumark (1991) finds support for the 
productivity hypothesis and reports selection bias to be minimal. The authors use 
panel data from National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men for the year 1976, 1978, 
and 1980. In cross sectional analysis, they report marriage premium to be around 11%. 
After controlling for fixed unobservable effects, they find that selection bias accounts 
for less than 20% of the marriage premium. 
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Korenman and Neumark's (1991) study has been criticized on two fronts. First, 
in their sample, martial status changes represent only a relatively small proportion. 
Second, the vast majority, or around 80% of the marital status change are divorces and 
second marriages. As discussed by Cornell and Rupert (1997), such an 
over-representation will bias the results. 
While some studies support the productivity hypothesis, other studies, like 
Cornell and Rupert (1997) report that selection bias plays a major role in explaining 
marriage premium. Similar to Korenman and Neumark (1990), Cornell and Rupert 
(1997) examine the relationship between marriage and wages using a sample drawn 
from the 1971, 1976, 1978 and 1980 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Young Men. 
In cross sectional analysis, Cornell and Rupert report (1997) the marriage 
premium to be 8.3%. After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity using fixed effect 
estimations, the marriage premium drops to below 5%, but remains significant. The 
authors then proceed to test whether the differences between the cross sectional 
results and fixed effect estimation results are statistically significant. A significant 
difference between the two sets of results will cast doubt on the validity of the cross 
sectional results. The authors perform a Wu Hausman test of the estimates, and find 
that the difference between the two sets of results to be statistically significant. As a 
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result, Cornell and Rupert (1997) conclude that selection plays a major role in 
explaining marriage premium. 
Cornell and Rupert (1997) further substantiate the selection bias hypothesis by 
investigating whether males who are to be married earn as much as the males who are 
already married. As their sample consists of several years of data, they construct a “to 
be married variable which identifies men who marry sometime during the sample 
period from 1971 to 1980." They report that males who will get married during the 
sample period earn at least as much as males that are already married in 1971. 
Therefore, Cornell and Rupert (1997) conclude selection bias to be the major cause of 
marriage premium. 
Most second-generation studies use fixed effect estimation to correct the 
selection bias problem. However, the fixed effect estimations methodology suffers 
from two major problems. First, if unobserved productivity characteristics are time-
varying, fixed effect estimates will be biased. Second, as discussed by Angrist and 
Krueger (1999), fixed effect estimates will also be biased if past earnings shocks 
affect current marital status. 
2.3 Third-Generation Studies 
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In view of the defects that fixed effect estimations have, two papers by 
Antonovics and Town (2004) and Krashinsky (2004) respectively have tried to 
address the problem by using twins data to difference out the unobserved productivity 
characteristics. The two studies, however, report different results. As the approach 
used in this thesis is similar to the methodology used in their papers, their results 
warrant a more detailed discussion. 
Antonovics and Town (2004) report that in cross sectional analysis, marriage 
premium stands around 20%. Within-twin differencing not only does not decrease the 
premium, but instead increases the marriage premium by 7% to 27%. These results 
are robust to different specifications of the wage function and various methods to 
correct for measurement errors. 
If selection bias is the cause of marriage premium, one would expect the 
marriage premium to decrease after within-twin differencing. The fact that the point 
estimate of within-twin estimation increases suggests that selection plays a minor, if 
any, role in the cross sectional relationship between marriage and wages. 
Antonovics and Town (2004) also find no evidence that the cause of marriage 
premium is household specialization. They establish the claim by including a variable 
on wife's full time work experience. If household specialization is the true cause of 
marriage premium, one would expect the coefficient on wife's full time work 
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experience to be negative and the coefficient on marriage to drop dramatically. As it 
turns out, the coefficient on wife's full time work experience is positive and 
insignificant. Furthermore, the estimated marriage premium still stands at 19%. Thus, 
the authors conclude that marriage premium is not due to household specialization. 
Instead, the authors put forth a new hypothesis, asserting that "because the income of 
married men affects the well-being of their spouses and children, married men may 
become more aggressive in the labor market. Thus, the marriage premium may reflect 
the fact that married men work harder and more assertively seek out raises and better 
job opportunities." 
Another third generation study, by Krashinsky (2004), uses a similar approach. 
He employs two methods to correct for selection bias, one using a correlated 
random-effects model and the other one using the same approach as I do in this thesis, 
within-twin differencing. Krashinsky (2004) uses data from Twinsburg Twins Festival, 
the same as Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994). Krashinsky (2004) also constructs 
various reliability ratios to account for the possibility of measurement error in twins 
data. In addition to looking at the casual effect of marriage, Krashinsky (2004) also 
investigates whether the apparent productivity increase from computer usage is due to 
selection bias. 
In cross-sectional analysis, Krashinsky (2004) reports results consistent with 
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previous studies. He finds that marriage premium for males to be around 25%. 
However, after accounting for selection bias, he reports entirely different results from 
Antonovics and Town's (2004). After controlling for unobserved productivity 
characteristics, he reports that marriage premium drops to almost zero and becomes 
insignificant, while education, union coverage and tenure remain positive and 
significant. He then concludes that “if the marriage institution itself improves the 
productivity of a married male, then controlling for ability should have no effect on 
this [marital status] coefficient's estimate. Similarly, if it is the case that married males 
are the recipients of employer favoritism or if employers discriminate against 
non-married males, then the addition of ability controls also should not affect the 
significance of the married-male indicator variable. The marked decrease in the 
coefficient's point estimate and significance is evidence against both of these theories, 
suggesting that a selection effect can account for this significance.. .these males were 
more productive males before they became married." 
Both papers, however, have problems of their own. In Antonovics and Town's 
(2004) paper, their sample size is relatively small, with only 128 observations. In 
addition, their marriage premium estimation is based on comparison of married males 
with other males, which include deceased, divorced and never-married males, while 
most of the other studies compare married males with spouses with never-married 
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males. 
Finally, Antonovics and Town (2004) put forth a new hypothesis without much 
further support. They simply claim that “marriage premium may reflect the fact that 
married men work harder and more assertively seek out raises and better job 
opportunities." They do not carry out tests to prove the new hypothesis, nor do they 
lay out how one is supposed to carry the test for the empirical implication of the new 
hypothesis. The formulation of their hypothesis makes it extremely hard, if at all 
possible, to verify the validity of their hypothesis. In their hypothesis, working harder 
does not mean working more hours. Rather, it is working more intensively. But how is 
one supposed to test that married men are working more “intensively” than other 
males? In addition, how can we ever hope to objectively quantify the "assertiveness" 
of a worker seeking out raises and job opportunities? Without quantification, there can 
be no test that can verify the truth or falsehood of the new hypothesis. While this is 
not a “crime” as serious as putting forth a tautology as if it had empirical content, the 
un-verifiability of the new hypothesis does deserve some criticisms. 
As for Krashinsky (2004), he does not run separate regressions on male and 
female segments. Instead, he runs regression on the entire sample and put in a dummy 
variable representing gender. This method of regression will produce different results 
than running two separate regressions on both male and female segments, if the 
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returns to the independent variables are different. In other words, Krashinsky's 
method allows only an intercept change for female, and does not allow for different 
estimates for different gender across other independent variables, while all previous 
studies do allow for the coefficients for other independent variables to vary across 
gender. His approach would not cause any problem if returns to the independent 
variables, like education and tenure are in fact the same across the two genders. 
However, numerous studies have indicated that this is unlikely to be the case. 
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Chapter 3: Empirical Methodology 
3.1 Fixed Effect Estimation 
To investigate which marriage premium hypothesis has more empirical merit, 
one needs a set of regressions "cleaned" of selection bias. Selection bias occurs when 
both employers and women value the same characteristics in men, and thus the 
apparent marriage premium is simply due to the returns to those characteristics, which 
are unobservable to the economists. Formally, the true model of wages is 
w , 二 a , + pXit + + 5A, + � (1) 
where w" is the natural log of wage of individual I at time t, Xu is the observable 
characteristics, Mu is the marital status, and Au is the unobservable productivity 
characteristics that affect wages, s“ represents statistical noise in the wage 
determining process. An and are taken to be i.i.d. random variables with zero 
means and constant variances, uncorrelated with each other. If Au is positively 
correlated with M", and An has a positive impact on w", then the estimated coefficient 
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on Mit will be biased upward if An is omitted. 
The standard remedy in the literature is to use fixed effect estimation. Essentially, 
this approach assumes A“ to be fixed over time. Using panel data, the unobservable 
characteristics can then be controlled for by differencing against the means, which 
results in the following equation: 
- w, = p � X i t + 义 - M . ) + 、 (2) 
3.2 Within-twin Differencing 
As discussed above, this approach is flawed if the unobservable characteristics, 
Au, are not time invariant and if past earnings shock affects current martial status. In 
this thesis, I will use monozygotic twins data to circumvent the two potential 
problems. Formally, the true model of wages is 
= + + m . , + + (3) 
W/2 二 而 + 风 2 + 續 i 2 + 礼 + 《 2 (4) 
where 1 stands for the first twin and 2 denotes the second twin. The key assumption 
here is that Au equals Ai2. In other words, we assume the unobservable productivity 
characteristics to be the same for monozygotic twins. Differencing (3) and (4) will 
give rise to an estimate of marriage premium free of selection bias. The resulting 
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equation will be as follows: 
Mjl — + - ^ i X ^ i X — ( 5 ) 
The resulting estimates can then be compared with the simple cross-sectional estimate. 
If the estimated k from equations (1) and (5) are similar, this implies that marriage 
premium is not caused by selection bias. On the other hand, if the two estimates differ 
significantly, then it suggests that selection bias explains a large part of marriage 
premium. 
3.3 Adjustment for Measurement Errors 
Although equation (5) eliminates selection bias due to unobserved heterogeneity, 
it tends to exacerbate measurement error bias for the variables on the right hand side, 
especially if the variables are highly correlated within twins (Griliches 1979). To 
eliminate bias caused by measurement error, I follow the method used by Ashenfelter 
and Krueger (1994). For cross-sectional analyses, each twin's education level and 
marital status are instrumented for using the other twin's report of his/her education 
and marital status. For within-twin analyses in schooling, I will use M =义—劣 as 
the independent variable, instrumented by A5 = S^ - S] , where S"' (m, n=l, 2) 
refers to the education level of the nih. twin as reported by the mth twin. Similarly, for 
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marital status, I will use AM' = M\ -M\ as the independent variable, instrumented 
by AM" = M^ - M l , where M: refers to the marital status of the ni\\ twin as 
reported by the mth twin. 
3.4 Value of Within-twin Differencing 
The use of twins data to difference out unobserved heterogeneity has gained 
popularity, but its usage has also elicited some criticisms. In this session, we will look 
at why we use within-twin differencing as well as some of the major drawbacks that 
its critics have mentioned. 
3.4.1 History of Within-twin Differencing 
Economics, as an empirical science, is in the business of establishing causation. 
But the road to causation is a long-winded one in economics. The reason is that 
economic data is not obtained in a laboratory like natural science, where every 
relevant variable can really be held constant. For example, in establishing the 
causation between temperature and pressure, we can hold volume constant in the 
laboratory. 
Economics is also unlike medical science, where experiments on human subjects 
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are possible. Ideally, if we want to establish causation between marriage and earnings, 
we would want to have two groups of randomly selected people, assigning one group 
to get married, and the other group to remain single. After certain number of years, we 
can then evaluate if marriage really does have an impact on earnings. What we would 
like to do is to render marriage an exogenous event. However, in economics, we 
cannot afford such an experiment. 
In the midst of adversity, economists do have a "causation weapon" that they 
brandish, regression. The most common way to investigate whether marriage has a 
casual effect on earnings is to apply least squares to a regression of log wage on 
marriage and other control variables. However, as we have discussed earlier in this 
Chapter, such a regression does not consistently estimate marriage premium due to 
omitted variable bias, and thus cannot serve as a basis for establishing causation 
between marriage and earnings. 
There are basically four ways that economists have developed over the years to 
address such an inconsistency in estimations. First, we can include more relevant 
variables as control. The solution inevitably runs into problems of measurement. After 
decades of research and debates, we still cannot agree on how to measure ability. If 
we cannot even measure ability, we can probably never aim to have an agreement on 
measuring more elusive qualities, like charisma and loyalty, which will probably 
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affect both marriage and earnings. 
The second way to address the inconsistency is to employ instrumental variable 
(IV) method. In our present case, the method requires at least one variable to be well 
correlated with marital status, but have no effect on wage except through martial 
status. Few variables seem to fulfill this requirement. For examples, birth order 
(Behrman and Taubman 1986), religion (Meng and Sentance 1984), and parents' 
education (Altonji 1996; Ginther 2000) are correlated with marital status, but they are 
all found to have effect on earnings. I have also utilized some health habits as possible 
I Vs. However, either they have low correlations with marriage, like smoking, or they 
obviously have an effect on earning, like health. 
The third way to address the inconsistency is to use fixed effect estimations. If 
panel data is available, such a method can be employed. However, as we have 
discussed above, such a method would run into problems if the unobserved 
heterogeneity is time-varying and if past earnings shock affects current marital status. 
The fourth way to address the problem was pioneered by an Indiana University 
Ph.D. student, Donald Gorseline (1932). He was investigating the problem of returns 
to education, which suffers from the same selection bias problem as the returns to 
marriage. Gorseline looked at a sample of brothers, and reasoned that as brothers are 
similar in their unobserved characteristics, like ability and family upbringing, 
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regressing the difference between brothers' earnings on the difference between 
brothers' schooling difference would give a better estimate of returns to education. 
Since his study, many researchers have taken the approach further. If a sample of 
brothers can serve as a method to difference out unobserved heterogeneity, would it 
not be even better to use a sample of monozygotic twins, who are identical in their 
genetic endowment, and extremely similar in their upbringing? 
The technique of within-twin differencing has been widely applied in estimating 
the returns to education. However, the technique has not been applied to the problem 
of marriage premium until recently. As we have seen, the first three methods of 
dealing with omitted variables bias in marriage premium problem are not satisfactory. 
Therefore, within-twin differencing seems to offer the best solution to the problem. 
3.4.2 Criticism of Twin Differencing 
The technique of within-twin differencing has drawn a fair amount of criticisms. 
Major critics include Griliches (1979), Neumark (1999), and Bound and Solon (1999). 
There are two major criticisms of using within-twin approach. The first one is that 
within-twin differencing does not solve the selection bias problem. In fact, it may 
even aggravate it. The intuition is the between-twin differences in the variables of 
interests, be it years of schooling or marital status, are not assigned randomly. Even 
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within twins, there are unobservable differences, which affect both the variable of 
interest as well as earnings. Thus, between-twin difference in martial status may itself 
be subject to selection bias. Under certain conditions, as we will discuss below, 
within-twin differencing may lead to bigger inconsistency. 
The second criticism concerns measurement error. The criticism here is that 
within-twin differencing tends to exacerbate measurement error bias, especially if the 
independent variables are highly correlated within twins. Fortunately, as we have 
multiple reports on certain variables, we are able to treat the measurement error as we 
have discussed earlier in this Chapter. Hence, we will discuss mainly the impact of 
selection bias within twins themselves. 
To illustrate the effect of selection bias within twins themselves, I will modify 
the model developed by Bound and Solon (1999) by changing the wage function to 
include a function that captures the probability of marriage. Suppose wages are 
determined by the following semi-log wage function: 
(6) 
where w/ is the log wage rate of worker i, and M is a. dummy variable that takes on 1 
with probability pi, and 0 with probability 1 -pi. The value of pi is, of course, bounded 
by 0 and 1. The value of pi is determined by the "ease of marriage" variable, which is 
denoted by x/, intending to capture all qualities, like ability, loyalty, dependability, that 
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make a man easier to enter into a marriage contract. Not surprisingly, I will assume 
that p '(x)>0. For simplicity, I will also assume that p ’(x) =X. Finally, Si is an error term 
representing everything else besides marital status that affects worker /，s wage rate. 
I will also assume that the worker chooses his “ease of marriage" variable, x, to 
maximize the following simple utility function: 
(7) 
where Ci(x) is cost-of-ease-of-marriage function that includes everything that goes 
into increasing one's chance of getting married like improving one's appearance and 
enhancing one's knowledge etc. I will assume the marginal cost of increasing one's 
chance of getting married is positive and increasing. In mathematical terms, C'i(x)>0 
and C，’i(x)>0. From equations (6) and (7), we know that worker's i optimal level of 
ease of marriage must satisfy the following first order condition: 
C,’(X,) = 傲 ( 8 ) 
As we assume p '(x)=X for simplicity, equation (8) can be simplified into 
C . \ X . ) = / ] X (9) 
Next, we specify the marginal cost of ease of marriage in an explicit form: 
C.\x) = Sx-^ju. (10) 
where S >0 represents the increasing marginal cost of ease of marriage, and /u. 
includes everything else that affects one's marginal cost of ease of marriage besides 
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the level of x. Combining (9) and (10), we have the following equation, which solves 
for the optimal level of ease of marriage: 
5 (11) 
which, in turn, would determine worker /，s probability of getting married, pi(xi), 
As one would reasonably expect, the level of ease of marriage increases with the 
marriage premium P . The higher the potential returns from marriage are, the higher 
the worker would increase his level of ease of marriage, and hence the higher the 
probability of getting married. The level of ease of marriage also increases with \ the 
marginal increase of probability of getting married with an additional unit of x. In 
other words, the larger the impact of increasing x on p, the probability of getting 
married, the higher one's optimal level of ease of marriage will be. Naturally, the 
optimal level of ease of marriage decreases with its marginal costs S. 
In cross-sectional analysis, if we apply a traditional OLS to equation (6) to 
estimate marriage premium, the probability limit of the OLS estimator of marriage 
premium will be 
p l im 艮OLS + Cov{x. ,£.)! Var{x. ) = SCov{ju.,）/ Var{ju^) (12) 
As we can readily see, the traditional OLS estimator is only consistent if and only if 
Cov(//.，Si) =0, which means that level of ease of marriage, and hence the probability 
of getting married, is exogenous to the wage equation. The chief concern among the 
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researchers on marriage premium is of course that Cov{ju.,£^) is negative. For 
instance, suppose a worker with certain characteristics, such an innate ability, such 
that his marginal cost of increasing his ease of marriage is low, also tends to be more 
productive at work. In this case, we would observe a negative correlation between 
andSj, leading to inconsistency and overestimation o f P . 
Within-twin differencing is aimed at solving the inconsistency of 台Q^S . However, 
as we will see, it does not always solve the problem completely. To gain a better 
understanding, I will extend the above model to a twins model. 
First, we will replace equation (6) with 
^ij 二 OC + P M i j ) i j � X i j ) ) + Sij (13) 
where Wy denotes the log wage of the yth twin in the ith family. Mis a dummy variable 
that takes on 1 with probability pij and 0 with probability 1- pij. Similar to the 
non-twins model, the value of pg is determined by the ease of marriage variable xy. I 
will further assume that s.j follows the error-component model such that 
〜 = / ； + 么 （14) 
where f\ is variation that is common to both twins, and 么 is the idiosyncratic 
variation that is unique to each twin. f\ represents genetic endowment and 
environmental influence that are common to both twins, while 么 captures factors 
affecting wage that are not shared by both twins. Furthermore, for simplicity, we will 
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assume Var(f.) = cr) , = a^ and Cov(fi,么)=Cov( , (j).^ )=0. Equation (14), 
together with the above simplification, will imply that 
C o r r O " 而 ) 二 a ] / ( o j + c r � （15) 
The intuition behind equation (15) is that Sij reflects genetic endowment and family 
influence that are shared by both twins. Thus, the correlation between sn and £i2 will 
depend on how much variation in is due to common variation/ and how much of it 
is due to idiosyncratic variation . 
Next, we will modify equations (7) and (9) into 
(16) 
and 
C Z ( X ) = (S^ + / / � . (17) 
Let jUij also follow an error in component model such that 
" " 〜 （18) 
Again, we can view g/ as genetic and family variations in marginal cost of 
increasing ease of marriage that are shared by both twins, while z,y reflects 
idiosyncratic variation in marginal cost that is unique to each twin. Similarly, for 
simplicity, we will assume that Var{g.) = a^ , Var(z.j) = crl and Cov(gi, ZijJ^Covfzn, 
Zi2) = Cov(Zii, (p.2) = Cov(Zi2, 
Combining equations (17) and (18) with the following first order condition, 
= p x (19) 
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We have the optimal level of ease of marriage of the yth twin of the /th family as 
follows. 
〒、入P-gi-ZijV S (20) 
The within-twin estimator of the marriage premium applies OLS to the 
regression of the between-twin difference in log wages on the between difference in 
marital status. 
-巧2 = A M i -Ma)他-4) (21) 
The probability limit of the estimator is 
plim台WT = P + Cov{M., — M.2,么—(l)a)/ Var{M^, -M ^ ^ ) 二 
P + Cov{x,, - X . 2 , 么 - 4 ) = — ) / (22) 
Hence, the within-twin estimator is only consistent if the idiosyncratic variations 
are unrelated to each other. In other words, within-twin estimator will only be 
consistent if the idiosyncratic variation in the wage equation,么.，is uncorrelated with 
the idiosyncratic variation in the marginal cost of increasing the probability of getting 
married, z”. If, on the other hand, Cov(么.,Zij) is negative, then the within-twin 
estimator will be inconsistent, and the returns to marriage will be overestimated. 
Cov( (f).. ’Zij) will be negative when, for example, one twin has certain 
unobservable qualities, like his loyalty and dependability, that decreases his marginal 
cost of increasing ease of marriage. Those qualities will result in a lower Zij. If the 
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same qualities also make him a better worker, resulting in a higher 么，we will observe 
a negative Cov((l)”’Zij). Therefore, even within twins, there may be selection bias, and 
within-twin estimator does not correct for it. 
To make the matter worse, under certain conditions, within-twin estimation may 
even aggravate the overestimation of returns to marriage as a result of selection bias. 
To illustrate this point, we will follow Griliches (1979) to modify the model. 
First, we will model the ease of marriage error term as 
= + kij (23) 
We will also model the wage error term � a s 
� = 涨 + 饥 ij (24) 
where hij, ky and my are mutually uncorrelated. The above model separates the ease of 
marriage error term into an endogenous component hy, which also affects wage, and 
the exogenous component The probability limit of 艮QLS shown in equations (6) 
can then be expressed as 
P limyS^,, = yff + S0Var(hi�/(Var(�)+ (25) 
A similar analysis on within-twin estimator will show that 
p = yS + 5eVar{h.^ - h.^)/{Var{h.^ - h.^) + Var{k.^ - k . ^ ) ) (26) 
Therefore, we can see that the inconsistency in between-twin estimator will be larger 
than that of a traditional cross-sectional OLS estimator if 
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Var(h丨 1 -h^,)/{Var(h,-h丨。+ Var(k丨^ -k^,)) > Var(/2,^)/(Far(\.) + Var(/c,^))(27) 
There is not any theoretical argument to support that condition 27 will NOT be 
the case. Hence, there is no guarantee theoretically within-twin estimator will be less 
inconsistent than the traditional OLS estimator. 
3. 4. 3 Value of Using Within-twin Differencing 
If within-twin differencing seems to suffer from the same omitted variable bias 
as the traditional OLS estimators, why should we bother to use the twins data then? 
There are at least two reasons for continuing the use of twins data. First, while 
theoretically it is possible that a within-twin estimator will be more inconsistent than 
an OLS estimator, as an empirical matter, our common sense tells us that there are 
grounds to believe that selection bias within twins will be less severe. After all, 
monozygotic twins share identical genes, and are brought up in the same family, and 
hence we would believe most of the variations in martial status are due to factors 
common to both twins, rather than due to idiosyncratic variations. 
Second, and also the more important reason, is that if we start with the 
assumption that the omitted variable bias tends to overestimate the marriage premium, 
then to the extent that the between-twin estimate is smaller than the OLS estimate, the 
within-twin estimation can be said to have tightened the upper bound of the marriage 
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premium. That is to say, if we find in the within-twin estimation that marriage has no 
effect on earnings, we can safely conclude that marriage will not have any positive 
effect on earning. 
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Chapter 4: Data Descriptions 
4.1 Twins Data 
The data we use are derived from the Chinese Twins Survey (CTS) which was 
carried out by the Urban Survey Unit (USU) of the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) during June-July, 2002, in five cities of China, funded by the Research Grants 
Council of Hong Kong. Based on existing twins questionnaires in the United States 
and elsewhere, the survey covered a wife range of socioeconomic information. The 
questionnaire was designed by two authors of this paper in close consultation with 
Mark Rosenzweig and Chinese experts in the Statistical Bureau. Adult twins aged 
from 18 to 65 (i.e. 1942-1986 birth cohorts) were identified by the local Statistical 
Bureau through various channels, including colleagues, friends, relatives, newspaper 
advertising, neighborhood notices, neighborhood management committees, and 
household records in the public security bureau. Overall, these channels permit 
roughly equal probability for contacting all twins in these cities, and in this sense, the 
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twins sample obtained is approximately representative. (The within-twins estimation 
method used for this study controls for the first-order effects of any unobserved 
characteristics that might have led to selection of twins pairs into the sample.) 
Questionnaires were completed through household face-to-face personal interviews. 
The survey was conducted with considerable care, including several site checks by 
Junsen Zhang and experts from the National Bureau of Statistics. With appropriate 
discussion with Mark Rosenzweig and other experts, data input was closely 
supervised and monitored by Junsen Zhang himself during July and August, 2002. 
This is the first socioeconomic twins data set in China and perhaps the first in 
Asia. The data set includes rich household socioeconomic information for respondents 
in five cities: Chengdu, Chongqing, Haerbin, Hefei and Wuhan. 
The data contain around 1510 pair of twins ^  I have restricted the sample in 
several ways to make the sample comparable to previous studies. 
1. I have limited the sample to working males who work at least 20 hours a 
week. 
2. I have limited the sample to only monozygotic twins. 
3. Twins with marital status other than married with spouses or never married 
are dropped. In other words, I only focus on the comparison between married 
‘Including 2 triplets. 
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males with spouses present and never-married males. 
4. To prevent the results from being affected by several extreme values, I have 
dropped observations with hourly wage more than RJMB500, or hourly wage 
less than 0. 
5. Observations with missing data are dropped. 
Restriction 1 narrows the sample to 502 pairs of male twins. Limiting the sample 
to MZ twins further reduces the sample to 316 pairs. Applying restrictions 3, 4 and 5 
results in the final sample of 241 pairs, of which 45 pairs (i.e. 19%) differ in the 
marital status. 
Table 1 shows the summary of the data after the restrictions. As expected, married 
males earn more than never-married men. On average, they earn RMB5.8 per hour, 
26% more than the average RMB4.6 per hour earned by never married males. Married 
workers on average are 38 years old, 13 year older than an average never-married 
male. Older age inevitably entails more work experience. In our twins sample, 
married workers have on average 19 years of work experience, 13 years more than 
never-married ones. In terms of years of schooling completed and hours worked per 
week, married workers are very similar to never-married males. Both the married and 
never-married workers attain approximately 12 years of schooling. Married workers 
put in around 44 hours per week on their jobs, compared with 45 for the 
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never-married workers. 
4.2 Non-twins Data 
For comparison purposes, non-twins households were taken from regular 
households with whom the USU conducts regular monthly surveys of their own. The 
USU started regular monthly surveys in the 1980s. Their initial samples were random 
and representative, and they have made every effort to maintain the good sampling 
characteristics. However, their samples have become less representative over time. In 
particular, given the increasingly high (low) refusal rate of the young (old) people, the 
samples have gradually biased toward oversampling old people over time. 
In order to make the sample comparable, I have applied similar restrictions as 
those on the twins data.. 
1. I have limited the sample to working males who work at least 20 hours a 
week. 
2. Observations with marital status other than married with spouse or never 
married are dropped. In other words, I only focus on the comparison between 
married males with spouses present and never-married males. 
3. To prevent the results from being affected by several extreme values, I have 
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dropped observations with hourly wage more than RMB500, or hourly wage 
less than 0. 
4. Observations with missing data are dropped. 
Applying restriction 1, 2, 3 and 4 results in a final sample of 8,238 observations. 
Table 2 shows the sample characteristics of the non-twins sample compared with 
the twins sample. As we can readily see, in terms of education composition and hours 
worked per week, the twins sample is very similar to the non-twins sample. However, 
the hourly wage, average age and years of work experience and percentage of married 
males differ dramatically. In the twins sample, the average wage is RMB5.7 compared 
with RMB6.7 in the non-twins sample. Average age in the twins sample is 33.1 
compared with 42.7 in the non-twins sample. As a result of higher age, the average 
years of work experience in the non-twins sample is also longer, standing at 22 years 
compared with 14 in the twins sample. The higher average age in the non-twin sample 
also explains why the percentage of married males in the non-twins sample (90%) is 
much higher than the twins sample (60%). 
As we have discussed earlier, the non-twin sample is biased toward sampling of 
older people, but it is also possible that the twins sample is biased toward younger 
people. For example, it may be that due to the method of data collection, the sample 
for twins are not random, but biased toward twins that are single. For example, it may 
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be that single twins are more likely to live together, and thus more likely to respond to 
the survey. As single twins are on average younger, the resulting sample will be biased 
toward younger twins. Therefore, it is important to keep the potential bias in mind 
when we look at the cross-sectional analyses for both the twins sample and non-twins 
sample. Fortunately, when we look at within-twin differencing, the fact that 
never-married twins are overrepresented does not constitute a problem. 
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Chapter 5: Empirical Results 
5.1 Cross Sectional Results: Twins Sample 
Table 3 shows the cross-sectional regressions for the twins sample. In addition to 
the independent variables that are shown, I have also included square of years of work 
experience, square of years of schooling completed, 14 industry dummies, 4 firm size 
dummies and 4 regional dummies, as consistent with previous studies. As the tenure 
data is not available, I have used years of working experience instead. In addition, 
because age and years of work experience are highly correlated (R =0.95), I have 
dropped one of the variables, age, to avoid multi-collinearity. 
I have also run regressions that include other variables like parents' educations, 
race, whether one is party member, whether one owns a phone, and health habits 
(drinking and smoking). The results with the variables included do not change the 
other coefficients much. Thus, they are dropped from the regressions for the sake of 
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simplicity. 
In cross sectional analysis (regression 1), the marriage premium is around 1% and 
very insignificant. This is in sharp contrast to almost all previous studies, which have 
reported marriage premium to be positive and significant. This result, therefore, is 
very surprising at first glance. 
Adding the highest education level attained by wife to the regression, however, 
changes the picture, we have divided wife's highest education into four groups, with 
the base group being wife with less than high school education. As we can see from 
column 2 of Table 3, the coefficient for married with spouse drops dramatically to 
-0.299 and becomes significant at the 5% level. The coefficients of wife's education 
become significant. Since the base group of wife education is wife with education less 
than high school, it means that compared with single men, married men with wives 
whose education are below high school earn 30% less. If their wives completed high 
school, married men earn 7% less. Once their wives have education above high school, 
married men earn more than single men. If their wives completed junior college or 
vocational school, married men earn 14% more, while if their wives completed 
university or above, married men earn 13% more. The marriage premium earned by 
the latter two groups of married men is consistent with previous studies. 
The fact that only married men with highly educated (above high school) wives 
enjoy marriage premium potentially explains the huge discrepancy in the 
cross-sectional marriage premium estimates between our sample and previous studies. 
All previous studies, with the exception of Loh (1996), have not controlled for wife's 
education in their cross sectional analyses. Thus, the higher the percentage of 
highly-educated wives in the sample, the higher the marriage premium it is likely to 
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be in regressions not controlled for wives' education. As one would reasonably 
expect, the percentage of highly educated wives is likely to be higher in an US or UK 
sample than our Chinese sample, one would expect the marriage premium to be 
higher in an US or UK sample. 
Ideally, we would want to compare the education level of wives in our sample 
with those in previous studies. However, since the data is unavailable, we have to 
resort to using the general characteristics of the female education level in the US or 
UK. In our sample, less than 10% of the wives have college degree or above. But 
according to Current Population Survey in March 2002, 25% of the female population 
in the US has college education or more. Therefore, it is likely that our explanation 
accounts for the discrepancy in the cross sectional marriage premium estimates 
between our sample and that of previous studies. 
If men benefit only from marrying better-educated wives, as in our sample, then 
the discrimination hypothesis is unlikely to be the reason for marriage premium. 
Proponents of the discrimination hypothesis argue that marriage premium exists 
because employers discriminate against single men. However, if the discrimination 
hypothesis is true, our results indicate that employers actually discriminate against 
married men with lowly-educated wives when compared with single men, whom in 
2 In other words, we are saying that omitting wife's education will result in an upward bias of the 
marriage premium. The reason is simple. As we have seen, the coefficient of wife's education on 
earnings is positive, and the correlation between wife's education and the dummy variable married with 
spouse is also positive (when the dummy married with spouse is zero, wife's education has to be zero, 
while if the dummy variable, married with spouse is 1，wife's education is also positive) 
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turn, are being discriminated against when compared with married men with 
highly-educated wives. For the discrimination hypothesis to work, one's wife 
educational level has to be readily observed by the employers, which is not obviously 
why this is true. At the very least, our results cast doubt on the discrimination 
hypothesis. 
Another reason for the apparent correlation between wife's educational level and 
earnings is the effect of education on the number of children a family has. Previous 
studies have shown that the higher the education level of the wives, the fewer children 
they will have, as their opportunity cost for raising children is higher. As time spent on 
raising children potentially diverts resources from income-generating activities, the 
positive impact of marrying higher educated wives could simply reflect the fact that 
they devote more efforts to income generating activities instead of raising children. 
While this explanation may sound valid, it is not likely to be the case for China, as 
China started the one-child policy in 1979. This policy limits the number of children 
in each family to only one. Households with above quota children will be penalized. 
The effect of the policy is reflected in our data. For the number of people who are 
married in our sample, 18% of them do not have any children, 77% of them have one 
child, and only 5% of them have number of children above one. One may wonder why 
we do not control for the number of dependents in our regression. The reason is that 
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because of the one child policy, the number of dependents is highly correlated with 
the marriage dummy. Most of the married men have one child, and none of the single 
men have any child, thus the R square between marriage and the number of 
dependenta is .92, causing multicollinearity. 
One can also argue that reverse causality is at work here, which means that men 
do not earn more because their wives have more education. Rather, higher income 
men tend to marry higher educated women. One way to test this hypothesis is to see if 
men with high wage growth are more likely to marry women with more education. 
Higher wage growth will lead to higher wage over time, other things being equal. 
Thus, if reverse causality is true, we would expect high wage growth to have a 
significant positive impact on the probability of men marrying better-educated wives. 
We cannot carry out this test because our data is limited to a single year only. 
However, as demonstrated by Loh (1996) and Korenman and Neumark (1991), 
reverse causality is unlikely to be the explanation for marriage premium. 
Next, we test one version of the productivity hypothesis, which states that 
marriage premium arises because of intra-household specialization. According to this 
hypothesis, married men earn more because they specialize in income production 
while his wife specializes in home production. The division of labor raises married 
men's productivity. If this hypothesis is true, we would expect that when we add a 
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dummy variable for a working wife, the coefficient of the dummy would be negative 
and significant. Column 3 in Table 3 shows that the coefficient of the presence of 
working wife is negative, as we would expect according to specialization hypothesis, 
but it is not significant. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that working 
wives have no impact on men's earnings. 
Another explanation for the apparent correlation between marrying highly 
educated wives and higher earnings could be that only highly educated men benefit 
from marriage. Highly educated men tend to marry highly educated women, and thus 
the cross-sectional significance of wives' education could be just “picking up" the 
effect of marriage on highly educated men. To test this hypothesis, we insert 
interaction variables between married men with spouses and men's highest education 
level attained. As we can see from column 4 in Table 3, the numbers are in the 
direction we would expect. The marital status coefficient remains negative, and all the 
interaction terms are positive. However, none of the interaction terms between 
marriage and education attainment is significant. Hence, the hypothesis that highly 
educated men tend to benefit more from marriage is unlikely to be true. 
Column 5 in Table 3 presents similar evidence that it is your wife's education 
rather than your own education that matters most when it comes to marriage premium. 
If your wife is lowly educated, then marriage premium is not significant whether you 
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are highly educated or not. On the other hand, if your wife is highly educated, there is 
a premium to marriage whether you are highly educated or not. 
If discrimination, reverse causality and specialization, and men's own education 
are not proper explanations for marriage premium, we are left with selection bias and 
other productivity hypotheses besides specialization hypothesis (which is one form of 
productivity hypothesis). All productivity hypotheses state that marriage itself 
enhances your productivity. In our case, it is equivalent to saying that marrying a 
highly educated wife itself enhances one's productivity, while marrying a lowly 
educated wife reduces one's productivity. We have already seen that one version of 
the productivity hypothesis is not consistent with our results. However, marriage can 
increase productivity for reasons other than specialization. For example, a 
better-educated wife may encourage their husbands to devote more resources to 
human capital production, like on the job training and continuous education. A 
better-educated wife may also offer better career advice, and therefore enhancing the 
career advancement of her husband. 
Whatever the source of productivity gain, all the productivity hypotheses imply 
that the number of years being married should have a significant and positive effect 
on wages. The reason is simple. The higher the number of years being married, the 
longer the time married men have in benefiting from productivity transferred from 
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their wives. Regression 6 casts doubt on all the productivity hypotheses, as we 
observe that years of marriage have no effect on wages. The coefficient for years 
married is negative, opposite to what we expect, and highly insignificant. 
5.2 Within-twin Differencing 
Our cross-sectional analyses so far lend most support to the selection bias 
hypothesis. Within-twin estimations of marriage premium provide further evidence 
for selection bias. Table 4 shows the within-twin estimates of marriage premium 
adjusted for measurement error. As we can see, all the marriage-related coefficients 
become insignificant. If the productivity hypothesis is right, and that marrying a 
better-educated wife does increase your productivity, we would expect the marriage 
coefficient to stay negative and significant, while coefficient of wife attaining above 
high school education to stay positive and significant. In our case, none of it is true. 
Our results also point out that the discrimination hypothesis and reverse causality are 
unlikely to be the reasons behind marriage premium. If employers do favor married 
males, we should observe that the marriage related coefficient to stay significant. 
Similarly, if reverse causality hypothesis is correct, the marriage-related coefficient 
should not become insignificant after twins differencing. The fact that both the marital 
4 2 
status indicator and dummy variables for education of wives become insignificant 
provides further support that marriage premium in China is mainly due to selection 
bias. Those males that get married are more productive even before they utter “1 do." 
The reason that the marriage coefficients become insignificant after 
twin-differencing could also be in principle due to the reduction in sample size. 
However, in our cross sectional and within-twin analysis, we have used the same 
sample. The reason for the reduction in observations is that when we do the within 
differencing, the observations will be dropped in half. As a result, the number of 
observations dropped from 482 in our cross sectional analysis (Table 3) to 241 
observations (Table 4). 
Taken together, while our cross sectional results may seem to indicate that 
marrying a highly educated wife helps married men's wages, our within-twin results 
show that much of it is due to selection bias. In other words, you do not have to thank 
your better-educated wife for your high income. The things that make you attractive to 
your wife make your income high. 
In a way, we can interpret the education level of one's wife as a proxy indicating 
the unobservable productivity characteristics that are not captured in our regressions. 
If your wife is highly educated, it indicates you possess highly productive 
characteristics like ability and reliability that are not captured in our regressions. On 
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the other hand, if your wife is lowly educated, it indicates that you are unproductive. 
Therefore, in cross sectional analysis, we observe that marrying a highly educated 
wife results in an earning premium, but the premium disappears once we control for 
unobservable productivity characteristics using within-twin differencing. 
Further support of selection bias comes from analyzing the returns to education of 
the married men. Following the model developed by Zhang and Liu (1999), we 
analyze the returns to education of the married men. Regression 9 in Table 5 shows 
that the return to education is 10.2% before adding wife's education as control. 
Adding wife's education as control decreases the coefficient to 6.6% and reduces it to 
insignificance, as we can see from regression 10. The coefficient for wife's education 
is positive and significant. The coefficient for wife completing junior college or 
vocational school is 36.1% while the coefficient for wife completing college or above 
is 43.2%. Furthermore, both coefficients are significant at 5% level. 
Our results are very similar to Zhang and Liu's (1999) results. As discussed by 
Zhang and Liu (1999), the fact that wife's education is positive and significant can be 
explained in two ways. The first explanation is cross productivity hypothesis, which 
states that after marriage, men increase in productivity as a result of their wives 
extending advice and information to them. The second explanation is assortative 
mating, which means that more productive males marry more highly educated females. 
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Zhang and Liu (1999) assume an assortative mating model where ability is 
unobservable to the econometrician, while it is observable to potential mates. In other 
words, assortative mating is a form of selection bias. In their model, the selection is 
based on ability. 
As we observe that one's own education becomes insignificant after adding wife's 
education as control, we are led to believe that cross-productivity hypothesis is 
unlikely to be the right explanation. As Zhang and Liu (1999) put it, “it would be 
difficult to believe that the cross-spouse effect is much larger than the own effect and 
that the own effect is insignificant both economically and statistically." On the other 
hand, the result can be much easily explained by selection bias based on ability, where 
both potential spouses and employers value ability. If ability is unobservable to 
employers but observable to potential mates, we would then readily observe that high 
wage men earners marry more highly educated wives. 
Therefore, our returns to education analysis lends further support to selection bias 
hypothesis, and specifically to the hypothesis that one's wife's educational level 
serves as a good proxy indicating one's unobserved productivity characteristics 
5.3 Cross Sectional Results: Non-twins Sample 
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When we look at the non-twins sample, we get similar results as the cross 
sectional results in the twins sample. Table 6 shows the cross sectional results of the 
non-twins sample. In addition to the independent variables that are shown, I have also 
included square of years of work experience, 14 industry dummies, and 8 occupation 
dummies as consistent with previous studies. As the tenure data is not available, I 
have used years of working experience instead. In addition, because age and years of 
work experience are highly correlated I have dropped one of the variables, 
age. 
I have also run regressions that include other variables like parents' education, 
race, whether one is party member, whether one owns a phone, and health habits 
(drinking and smoking). The results with the variables included do not change the 
other coefficients much. Thus, they are dropped from the regressions for the sake of 
simplicity. 
Regression 11 in table 6 shows the regression without adding wife's education as 
control. Similar to the twins sample, we do not observe positive and significant 
marriage premium, which stands in stark contrast with all previous studies on 
marriage premium. The coefficient for marriage is 0.016 and is insignificant even at 
the 10% level. 
Regression 12 shows the regression after adding wife's education as control. The 
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marriage coefficient becomes negative, although it remains insignificant. However the 
coefficients of the wife's educational level behave in the direction expected, and are 
all significant even at the 1% level. The results seem to indicate that if you marry a 
wife with less than high school education, you will not benefit from marriage. 
However, if you marry a wife with at least high school education, your wage will 
increase by 12.6%. The higher the education level of your wife, the more you benefit 
from marriage. 
Next, I test the specialization hypothesis similar to what I have done on the twins 
sample by inserting a dummy variable that captures whether one's wife is working or 
not. If the specialization hypothesis is correct, we would expect the coefficient on the 
dummy variable to be negative as well as significant as a working wife reduces the 
opportunity for specialization. Contradictory to what the theory would predict, we 
obtain a coefficient that is positive and significant. Regression 13 indicates that a 
working wife increases your hourly wage by 6.4%, other things equal. Hence, our 
results do not support the specialization hypothesis. 
Finally, we test whether the apparent positive relationship between wife's 
education and one's wages is due to the fact that more highly educated men benefit 
from marriage more. Once again, our results indicate that it is unlikely to be the case. 
Regression 14 shows that it is your wife's education, rather than your own education, 
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that matters when it comes to marriage premium. 
Overall, our results on the non-twins sample are very similar to the twins sample. 
However, in the non-twins sample, it is not possible to carry out within-twin 
differencing. And since we do not have a panel data, it is not possible to carry out 
fixed effect estimation either. 
5.4 Female Results 
All previous studies focus on the male segment, and to make my study 
comparable to previous investigations, I have also discussed mainly the male results. 
But it would also be interesting to look at whether marriage premium exists in the 
female segment. 
Table 7 shows the cross sectional results on the female twins sample. The 
coefficients on marriage remain insignificant whether husband's education is included 
or not. Therefore, our twins sample indicates that marriage premium is not a robust 
phenomenon in China. 
Table 8 looks at the non-twins sample. The non-twins sample shows similar 
pattern as the male sample. Before spouses' education level is added as control, the 
resulting marriage coefficient is insignificant. After adding spouses' education level as 
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control, the marriage coefficient become negative while the dummy variables for 
different education level become significant and positive. The results indicate that 
Chinese women, similar to Chinese men, only benefit from marriage if they marry a 
husband whose education level is above high school. 
4 9 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
While nearly all previous studies have shown marriage premium to be positive 
and significant in cross sectional analyses, our twins sample indicates that marriage 
itself has no impact on wages, in contrast to all previous studies. However, when we 
look closer by controlling for the education level of wife, we find that men benefit 
from marriage, but only if they marry a wife whose education level is above high 
school. Our results seem to indicate that in China, it is not marriage that counts. 
Rather, it is marrying highly educated wives that counts. 
However, when we investigate further by looking at the within-twin estimation, 
we find that the apparent premium of marrying a highly educated wife is due to 
selection bias. Our results indicate that those males who get married are more 
productive even before they utter “I do." 
As discussed in Chapter 5, we argue that one's wife's education level serves as a 
good proxy indicating one's unobservable productive characteristics. If you want to 
know if a man is productive or not, besides looking at the obvious characteristics like 
work experience and education, we argue that you can also look at his wife's 
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education attainment. If his wife is highly educated, it indicates that he possesses 
highly productive characteristics that his resume probably does not capture. On the 
other hand, if his wife is lowly educated or if he is single, it indicates that he is not as 
productive. Our interpretation explains why in cross sectional analysis, we observe 
marrying a highly educated wife results in a premium, but the premium disappears 
once we control for unobservable productivity characteristics. To check the robustness 
of our twins results, we also perform cross sectional analysis using the non-twins 
sample. We observe similar results as in the twins sample. Men seem to only benefit 
from marriage if they marry highly educated wives. 
Taken together, our results indicate there is no casual relationship between 
marriage and wages in China. Cross sectional results in both twins and non-twins 
samples indicate that men appear to only benefit from marrying highly educated 
wives. However, our within-twin estimations show that the marriage premium exists 
because of selection bias, rather than a casual effect of marriage. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Married with spouse Never married 
Hourly wage (RMB) 5.8 4.6 
^ ^ 
Hours worked per week 44.4 45.3 
(7.9) (10.0) 
Age (years) 38.2 25.1 
Years of schooling completed 12.0 12.6 
^ 
Years of work experience 18.8 5.7 
(8.7) ( 3 ^ 
Sample size 291 191 
Numbers in the parenthesis are standard deviations 
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Table 2: Comparison of sample with population 
Twins Sample Non-twins Sample 
Hourly wage (RMB) 5.4 6.7 
Hours worked per week 44.4 41.9 
^ 
Highest education attained (%) 23.2% 31 % 
—primary school 
---high school 25.5% 25% 
—junior college or 38.9% 33.6% 
vocational school 
—university or above 12.3% 10% 
Age (years) 33.1 42.7 
^ (9.77) 
Years of work experience 13.6 22.2 
^ (10.4) 
Percentages married 60% 90% 
Sample size 
Numbers in the parenthesis are standard deviations 
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Table 3: Cross-sectional analysis (twins, male) 
Dependent variable equals /^(hourly wage) 
I ⑴ I (2) I (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Married, spouse present ^ -.299** -.270* -.401** ^ T ^ -.286** 
(.50) (2.12) (1.86) (2.41) (1.28) (1.96) 
Years of working experience .028** .032*** .035*** .033*** .032*** .034** 
(2.55) (2.93) (3.20) (3.02) (2.91) (2.29) 
Selfhighest education a t t a i n e d . 2 3 9 * * * .198** ^ ^ ^ ^ 
(2.73) (2.27) (2.27) (0.70) (2.48) (2.30) 
---high school 
— u n i o r c o l l e g e ^ .339*** . 2 6 8 * * * . 2 6 8 * * * - 2 5 4 * * * . 2 6 9 * * * 
(4.43) (3.54) (3.55) (1.56) (2.93) (3.59) 
vocational school 
…university or above .581*** .464*** .465*** .383** .442*** .465*** 
(5.42) (4.23) (4.22) (2.22) (3.77) (4.23) 
Married with spouse x wife's .230* .243* .215 .232* 
highest education attained (1.71) (1.82) (1.58) (1.75) 
- high school 
- j un io r college or .441*** .469*** .412*** .439*** 
vocational school (3.15) (3.33) (2.84) (3.15) 
-university or above .426** .466*** .405** .428** 
(2.39) (2.52) (2.16) (2.43) 
Working wife -.074 
(.96) 
Married, spouse present x own .171 
highest education attained (1.18) 
- high school 
- j un io r college or .142 
vocational school (.91) 
-university or above .116 
(.54) 
Years married -.005 
(.35) 
Self highly educated^ x wife .053 
lowly educated (.46) 
Self lowly educated x wife .220** 
highly educated (1.97) 
Self highly educated x wife .265** 
highly educated (2.34) 
Sample size 482 482 
R square .31 .33 .33 ~33 32 3 3 
*Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level 
Numbers in the parenthesis are absolute t ratios 
3 Lowly educated is defined as finishing high school or below, highly educated is defined finishing 
junior college or vocational school or above 
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Table 4: Estimates of within-twin marriage premium'^ 
(Corrected for measurement error using IVs). 
Dependent variable equals /w(hourly wage) 
Within-twin^ Within-twin 
_(7) W 
Married, spouse present -.069 .033 
^ 
Years of working experience .020 .019 
^ ^ 
Years of schooling completed .008 .009 
i m ^ 
Wife's education -.11 
—completed high school (.66) 
-completed junior college or -.08 
vocational school (.42) 
—university or above -.139 
Sample Size 241 241 
氺Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, **氺Significant at 1% level 
Numbers in the parenthesis are absolute t ratios 
4 One puzzling result is that not only is all marriage related coefficients become insignificant, but other 
coefficients have also become significant, notably the years of schooling. To check against possible 
programming error, I have run within-twin regression with female observations included, the results 
shown that schooling has a significant and positive effect on wages after twins differencing. The reason 
behind the disappearance of schooling effect after twin differencing is not investigated in this paper, but 
it id certainly an area that worth looking into. 
5 For within twins estimations, the dependent variable is the difference in ln(hourly wage), and the 
independent variables are differences instead of levels. 
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Table 5: Estimates of Returns to Education without/with wife's education 
Dependent variable equals /^(hourly wage) 
Education (own) .102* .066 
(1.69) (1.06) 
Years of work experience .006 .001 
^ ( m 
Wife's education .182 
—completed high school (1.21) 
—completed junior college or .361** 
vocational school (2.21) 
—university or above .432** 
(2.20) 
Sample size | 291 | 291 
* Significant at 10% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 1% level 
Numbers in the parenthesis are absolute t ratios 
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Table 6: Cross-sectional analysis (male, non-twins) 
Dependent variable equals /"(hourly wage) 
(11) (12) (13) 一 (14) 
Married, spouse present .016 -.042 -.063* -.024 
(.48) (1.16) (1.81) (.65) 
Years of working experience .054*** .051*** .049*** .053*** 
(16.05) (15.2) (14.4) (15.7) 
Self highest education attained .156*** .126*** .130*** .145*** 
- h i g h school (7.94) (6.28) (6.46) (7.37) 
—junior college or .274*** .233*** .238*** .221*** 
vocational school (13.0) (10.7) (10.9) (5.86) 
—university or above .530*** .473** .479*** .471*** 
(17.40) (14.7) (14.9) (10.7) 
Wives' highest education attained .104** .087*** 
—high school (5.52) (4.45) 
—junior college or .120*** .094*** 
vocational school (5.91) (4.39) 
---university or above ,136*** .106** 
(3.25) (2.49) 
Wife working .064*** 
(3.61) 
Self highly educated ^  x wife lowly 058 
e " (1.49) 
Self lowly educated x wife highly 119*** 
educ— (4.10) 
Self highly educated x wife highly 097*** 
educated … 
(2.56) 
Sample size 8238 8238 
R square 
*Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level 
Numbers in the parenthesis are absolute t ratios 
6 Lowly educated is defined as finishing high school or below, highly educated is defined finishing 
junior college or vocational school or above 
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Table 7:Cross-sectional analysis (female, twins) 
Dependent variable equals /^(hourly wage) 
(15) (16) 
Married, spouse present -..014 -.083 
(.14) (.64) 
Years of working experience .030* .032* 
(1.80) (1.93) 
Years of schooling completed .082*** .078*** 
(5.62) (5.31) 
Husband's highest education attained 
—High school^ 
- Jun io r college or vocational school .089 
(1.00) 
—University or above .117 
(1.09) 
Sample size 304 304 
R square .39 .40 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 1% level 
Numbers in the parenthesis are absolute t ratios 
7 Here I only have 3 categories for husband's education level attainment, below junior college or 
vocational school, completed junior college or vocational school, and completed university or above. 
The reason is that observations of husband having below high school attainment are too few (8 
observations), and thus, I group the two categories, below high school and completed high school 
together. 
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Table 8:Cross-sectional analysis (female, non-twins) 
Dependent variable equals /"(hourly wage) 
( n ) (18) 
Married, spouse present -.017 -.125*** 
(.49) (3.29) 
Years of working experience .051*** .049*** 
(13.5) (12.9) 
Self highest education attained ** /l^Pox** 
(8.68) (6.68) 
…high school 
； ！ “ ooQ*** 979*** 
- , m o r college or (^ ^^石：） (10.5) 
vocational school 
…university or above ( I S ) ) * 
“ 113氺氺氺 




：： “ “ 154*** —junior college or 
vocational school 
—university or above o � 
(o.1o) 
Sample size 6519 6519 
R square .28 .29 
* Significant at 10% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 1% level 
Numbers in the parenthesis are absolute t ratios 
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Appendix I: Some Other Thoughts on Marriage Premium 
During an interview for Sir Edward Youde Memorial Fellowship, I was asked by 
one of the interviewers, “Say if you have proved or disapproved that there is a casual 
relationship between marriage and earnings, what possible impact could this finding 
have?" I was not prepared for this question, and I struggled to give a satisfactory 
answer. Nevertheless, the Council awarded me the fellowship in the end. I think I owe 
them a better answer. 
All research on marriage premium aims to answer one major question, "does 
marriage have a casual effect on earnings? If so, why?" Few researchers, however, 
have asked themselves, “Why bother to study the problem at all?" 
The question is difficult to answer because the problem of marriage premium 
seems to have little importance. After all, it is not obvious how anyone can utilize the 
finding in a fruitful way. It is unlikely that our finding will influence anyone's 
decision to get married or not to get married. It seems no one is going to be affected 
by whether we establish a casual relationship between marriage and earning. Our 
work creates no impact, or at least so it looks. 
Some researchers have argued that learning about marriage premium enables us 
to understand more about the factors that affect wages. With that understanding, we 
are more equipped to understand the impact of changing marital status composition of 
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the labor force on the economy. For example, we might know the impact of increasing 
divorce rate on the economy. Some have also argued that our finding may influence 
certain government policies. For example, if we successfully establish a causal 
relationship between marriage and earnings, we may advise the government to 
implement policy to encourage people to get married. On the other hand, should we 
establish that the casual relationship is non-existent, we could advise the government 
to allocate resources somewhere else. 
The hope for impact may be real, but the hope is probably misplaced. For 
economists to have influence on marriage-related issues, there are at least two major 
difficulties. First, the researchers have to agree on the findings first. When you have 
economists, you inevitably have disagreement. We are known to disagree on 
everything that can be disagreed upon. Even the best economists hold very different 
views on very important issues. Milton Friedman, arguably the best economist of the 
last century, has been pushing for as little government intervention in the economy as 
possible. On the other hand, Joseph Stiglitz, also a Nobel Laureate, does not seem to 
think that small government is always good, and that government interventions may 
be justified more often than the free-market ideologists think. 
The second difficulty, economists having impact on public policy, is at least as 
daunting as the first one. Economists lack credibility in predicting economic 
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phenomenon, and as such are not often consulted on even the most important policies 
related to economics. Any discipline which wants itself to be respected as a science 
has to at least excel in two things, explanation and prediction. We are simply very bad 
when it comes to prediction. The reason is two-fold. First, because of the nature of 
economics, experiments in general are impossible to perform. We cannot take a group 
of individuals, split them randomly in half, and assign one group to get married, and 
the other group to remain single. Such an experiment would allow us to establish 
causation between marriage and earnings far more easily. Unfortunately, in economics, 
we do not have such a luxury. Without experiment, it is a lot harder to establish 
causation. Without establishing causation, prediction will not be accurate. 
Second, most economists seem to get detached from reality. As George Stigler 
(1990) puts it, "the criterion of congruence with reality should have been 
sharpened—sharpened into the insistence that theories be examined for their 
implications for observable behavior. Not only were such implications not sought and 
tested, but there was a tendency, when there appeared to be a threat of an empirical 
test, to reformulate the theory to make the test ineffective. Economists did not 
anxiously seek the challenge of the facts." Economics is an empirical science, but 
most practitioners in the field treat it more as a theoretical subject. 
The nature of economics, together with the approach of economists, fails to gain 
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economists' credibility in influencing the government policy. If that is so even for 
more important issues like economic growth, what chance do economists have in 
influencing policies on marriage? 
The chance is, in my view, very slim. Economics, as an empirical science to have 
empirical impact on humanity, has failed. 
Economics as a means to an end may have failed, but to me, economics is also an 
end in itself. As Paul Krugman writes it, the ultimate satisfaction he derives from 
economics is not the impact he creates. Rather, it is simply the joy of understanding. It 
is satisfying the urge to understand the world in which one finds himself. We may 
never agree on whether marriage affects earnings. Even if we do, we may never utilize 
the finding in a fruitful way. But all is not lost. We have gained the joy of 
understanding along the way. And that in itself is valuable. 
Economics as a means to an end may have failed, but economics as an end in 
itself will never fail. 
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